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On Being Among Friends: A Response to
Eugene Garver's For the Sake of Argument
Richard K. Sherwin*
Being among friends, I allow myself to begin with a confession.
I have struggled with my response to Gene's book. I've asked
myself: how do I do justice to this gesture of friendship? How can I
reciprocate his gift to us, this book, For the Sake of Argument1? How
can I be a good friend?
What is a friend?
Without an answer to this question, how can I know I've done well?
Let me begin with something about which I am more certain.
Eugene Garver has done us all a great service. He has written a
lucid book about what needs to be integrated into our current
understanding of practical reason. He invites us to set pathos and ethos,
affect and character, alongside conventional notions of rationality.
The good person is someone who deliberates and persuades within a
broad rhetorical base. Reason does not have to be disinterested to retain
its identity as reason. Practical wisdom doesn't have to be anchored in
rules, or avoid appealing to emotions, interests, or prejudices, to remain
prudent. In short, practical reasoning is rhetorical, as well as ethical.
As a "living faculty,"2 rather than a mechanical calculator of
* Richard K. Sherwin is a Professor of Law and Director of the Visual Persuasion
Project at New York Law School. His publications include: POPULAR CULTURE AND LAW
(2006); WHEN LAW GOES Pop: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR
CULTURE (2000); Law's Enchantment: The Cinematic Jurisprudence of Krzysztof
Kieslowski, in LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 87 (Michael Freeman ed., 2005); Anti-
Oedipus, Lynch: Initiatory Rites and the Ordeal of Justice, in LAW ON THE SCREEN 106
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005); Law in Popular Culture, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
AMERICAN LAW 95 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); Law's Beatitude: A Post-Nietzschean
Account of Legitimation, 24 CARDozO L. REV. 683 (2003); Nomos and Cinema, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1519 (2001).
1. EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT: PRACTICAL REASONING,
CHARACTER, AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF (2004).
2. Id. at 4 ("Understanding practical reasoning as 'the exercise of a living faculty in
the individual intellect' is the purpose of this book. Reasoning as the exercise of a living
faculty is ethical reasoning. We shouldn't infer that when method fails us, reason fails us
too. Like eros, praxis is a great leveler.").
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interests, practical reason flourishes in the spirit of friendship.
Friendship, it would seem, is on many people's minds these days.3
As the nation-state falters,4 and we search for new models for political
community, it is not surprising that we turn to character and friendship as
sources of normative replenishment. It is as if we were seeking anew the
pre-contractual elements of civil society. We are drawn to revisit the
mythical stories of political origin: Hobbes's cowering citizen;5
Rousseau's noble savage; 6 Aristotle's political friend. 7
And today, as the Internet links us all up in instant global
communication, we wonder: what model of self will do justice to the
circumstances of our lives? Is it enough to construct and project virtual
identities, to create digital avatars at will? Is it enough to mingle
affinities with others in a network of momentary amity? 8
Jacques Derrida has recently written about political friendship, 9 as
has Peter Goodrich.' 0 There is perhaps more boldness in Gene Garver's
work.
After all, it was only a couple of decades ago that Alasdair
Maclntyre hit the philosophical scene with his glum indictment of
contemporary culture in After Virtue." According to Maclntyre, not
only have we lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of
morality, but, he adds, "the dominant philosophies of the present,
analytical or phenomenological, [are ... ] powerless to detect the
disorders of moral thought and practice."'12  In sum, Maclntyre
concludes, "philosophical analysis will not help us.' 13
In the face of such a devastating cultural critique, Gene's book is
most welcome. His message is that things are not as bad as Maclntyre
says they are. We can still reason together as political friends. In a
word, we still have character.
But what sort of character is it?
Paul Kahn suggests it is the character of Hercules, Dworkin's fabled
3. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP (2000); Peter Goodrich,
Laws of Friendship, 15 LAW & LITERATURE 23 (2003); Friends in High Places: Amity
and Agreement in Alsatia, 1 INT'L J.L. IN CONTEXT 73, (2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=760376 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
4. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 667-714 (2002).
5. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1982 [1651]).
6. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY 67-137 (1984 [1755]).
7. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 49, 181 (1969 [350 BC]).
8. See generally Jack Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63 (2004-2005).
9. See DERRIDA, supra note 3.
10. See Goodrich, supra note 3.
11. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1984).
12. Id. at 2-3.
13. Id. at 2.
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judge. 14 In this view, character is a matter of commitment to principles.
But I wonder.
I had thought that what was distinctive about the narrative turn15 in
contemporary philosophy and jurisprudence was precisely its recognition
of the inadequacy of abstract principles as a basis for judgment.
In addition to our effort to anchor character in principles, I would
have thought the challenge that we face is to construct character and
community through our choice of root metaphors16 or narratives, through
our joint efforts to realize a self-reflexive, constitutive ethos. 7
The question then becomes: what sorts of images cue up what sorts
of emotional responses, or collective memories, or shared cultural
resources? What kind of community do we create in conversation
together? Consider, for example, Johnnie Cochran beseeching jurors to
"do the right thing" in the O.J. Simpson case. This was not a matter of
principle, but rather of discursive practice and the dialogical community
to which it gave rise. Cochran was emplotting his listeners in a
subjunctivized, 18 "heroic" struggle against "endemic police racism," a
state of affairs, according to Cochran, that only the jurors, by their
verdict, could end.19
Or consider the initial state criminal trial against the officers
responsible for beating motorist Rodney King. In that case the defense
team sought to re-constitute reality by digitizing George Holiday's
amateur videotape, which had fortuitously captured the event. But visual
reality, no less than the verbal kind, needs narrative emplotment for
meaning's sake. In the defense version of Holiday's videotape, jurors
saw the officers' batons coming down only when King's body rose up
off the ground. When he lay prone, as ordered, the batons harmlessly
lifted into the air. In this way, when they watched, the jurors saw
causation at work. It was King himself who, in defiance of police orders,
caused the batons to rain down upon him. Or so several jurors, when
called upon to explain their verdict of acquittal, would later assert.2 °
It wasn't abstract principle that guided their judgment. It was a
14. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 379-99 (1986).
15. See, e.g., Peter Goodrich, Antirrhesis: Polemical Structures of Common Law
Thought, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 57 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1996);
Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal
Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 543 (1988); DONALD SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH AND
HISTORICAL TRUTH: MEANING AND INTERPRETATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS (1 st ed. 1982).
16. See VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC ACTION IN
HUMAN SOCIETY 29, 48 (1974).
17. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984).
18. JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 25-26 (1986).
19. See RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES Pop: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN
LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 44-46 (2000).
20. Id. at 212-213.
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story about the justified use of force.
It's the same with Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.21  As Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner observe, Scalia's
narrative invokes a mythic tale of "Adultery as Combat. 22 Or consider
Justice Kennedy's narrative in Freeman v. Pitts.23 There, Kennedy offers
another familiar narrative type: the tale of the "Conquering Hero Turned
Tyrant." 24
Rather than obsessing, in the company of Dworkin's Hercules,
about the right (principled) outcome, these decision makers seem more in
tune with Richard Bernstein's concern with the contingencies of human
meaning making.
Rather than calling Ronald Dworkin to mind, in reading Gene's
work I was reminded of Richard Rorty. Character is embodied in the
give and take of human conversation and storytelling. Rather than
embedded principles, this is a matter of radical contingency.26
It's not about right answers, but rather a process of unfolding
decisions out of local practices. As Rorty puts it, "It is a matter of
playing off scenarios against contrasting scenarios, projects against
alternative projects, descriptions against redescriptions. 27
In his book, Gene gives us examples of this sort of thing. But I
must admit, I wasn't always sure what to make of them, or how to
generalize from them.
For example, it is indisputable that South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission started a national conversation with noble
goals.28 But as South Africans know, the public performance was not
always echoed in private. And the sad fact is that to a significant extent a
good number of South Africans today have not reconciled with their past.
Not without reason.
For the most part, many black South Africans have remained poor
and isolated, while many white South Africans remain rich and powerful.
Victims got to speak, yes; but later they were left alone: with their grief,
without reparations or therapeutic intervention to ease their suffering and
loss.
In Gene's discussion of practical reason as exemplified in Brown v.
21. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
22. See ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 81 (2000).
23. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
24. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 22, at 153.
25. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM:
SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983).
26. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1980).
27. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 174 (1989).
28. See GARVER, supra note 1, at 17-21.
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Board of Education,29 we encounter a compelling vision of equality
between the races.30 But what are we to make of the fact that the ethos
exhibited in Brown could not keep the Court from subsequently losing
interest in historical reconciliation between the races? It could not keep
the post-Brown Court from talking about the goal of "reducing the
historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities"'3' as an "unlawful
interest in racial balancing. ' 32
And today, affirmative action strikes many as an affront, a social
injustice.
Is this a sign of bad character?
Gene says that value pluralism and pragmatism are successors to
Aristotle's project. But how does this help us avoid the dangers of
treating law as simply a form of politics? Friendship is nice, but politics,
as everyone knows, is a game of power.
Why should I turn to Gene and Aristotle's Ethics rather than to Karl
Rove33 and Machiavelli's The Prince?
I need to make choices. How should I proceed?
Should I become the instrumental character, the one who weighs
means and ends?
Or should I prefer instead to become the Kantian rational character,
who posits universal human rights and principles?
Or should I perhaps take on the guise of the Kierkegaardian
therapist, the character who shows the dangerous deceits of aesthetics?
This is Maclntyre's cast of modem characters.34
How am I to say which, or whether, or when, one is better than
another? And what if they are all equally fictitious, or at least equally
lacking in all but self-serving, self-evident rationalizations, as Maclntyre
asserts?
Or maybe now there's a fourth character that we should add to
Maclntyre's list. Let's call him the postmodern rhetorician, the
inveterate mapmaker.
The rhetorician categorizes moves and makes maps so that he
knows where he stands. "Oh, so now you're playing the structuralist
binary card," he'll say. Or the reifying historicist card. Or the genealogy
of power card. "I've got your number," cries the self-comforting
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. GARVER, supra note 1, at 69.
31. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978).
32. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003).
33. For more information on Karl Rove, advisor to President George W. Bush, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KarlRove.
34. See MACINTYRE, supra note 11.
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cartographer.35
But none -of these characters, not even the postmodern one, really
counters Nietzsche's devastating critique.
Again, using Maclntyre as my double here, the critique goes as
follows: In the absence of good reasons for particular moral preferences,
why not let the will replace reason? "Let us make ourselves into
autonomous moral subjects by some gigantic and heroic act of the
will." 3
6
So we start our moral quest from scratch, with an act of will.
But how do we know, beyond the desire that it be so, what the new
tables of morality should contain, or how they should be created?
Gene wants to save us from such moral confusion.
Taking a page from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, he finds virtue
in friendship. He reminds us that we honor others in virtue of something
that they are or have done to merit the honor.
But what is it that we honor today?
What is honor?
What do we value in a friend?
The times play a hand in assigning meanings to these words. For
example, it is not unknown for virtue and vice to trade places. Consider
the Greek experience during the Peloponnesian War. In his history of
that terrible conflict, Thucydides writes: "Reckless audacity came to be
considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious
cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness.... [T]he
use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation." 37
I will resist the temptation to make comparisons between that period
and other, more recent moments, when the fog of war once again clouds
the mind and perverts human judgment. Suffice it to say, the meaning of
words like "honor," "character," and "friendship" is hardly written in
stone.
And.we might well ask, what meanings do these words have based
on our own cultural practices? What do we honor? What should, we
honor?
Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, we shall hardly
find vindication in Aristotle's ethics.
So I ask, what kind of character should I become?
And how free am I to choose?
35. Cf Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047
(2002); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV.
205 (1979).
36. MACINTYRE, supra note 11, at 114.
37. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Book 3.82.4) (Robert Maynard
Hutchins et al. eds., Richard Crawley trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952) (427 BC).
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Heraclitus famously said: "Character is fate., 38 A two-way street:
at once deterministic and open-ended. If I choose my self, I determine
my fate. If fate elects me, I am chosen.
If I were naturally gifted with the virtue of prudent judgment in the
way of personal excellence, I most likely would be able to answer this
question.
I think Gene is suggesting that by engaging in practical reasoning I
might find the way out of my ethical dilemma. But if I lack the requisite
virtues, how am I to engage in such reasoning in the first place? And
won't my ignorance even prevent me from recognizing such reasoning
when I come across it?
It's the old Socratic query: can virtue be taught, or is it a gift?39
Can I learn, and teach others, to be a friend?
When I think of the requirements of friendship, at least as Aristotle
understood it, I find myself growing pale in the face of what it demands
of me. Like the demand to share all things in common for the sake of the
common good.
But what is the common good? In common with whom?
Not many people these days seem to be choosing a common good.4 °
Not unless they happen to find pleasure in sharing the goods with the
friends that they have. The common wisdom seems to suggest no one is
obliged to share anything with anyone. Common access is tragic. Give
people access to a common good and they'll just use it up, with no
thought of tomorrow. It's the tragedy of the commons, the economists
tell us. That's why we're told to acquire our own stuff, and to compete
in the open market for the right to use other people's stuff.
Property rights give me power and control. I can protect the value
of my things. And I can keep people out. I can even block their
unlicensed access to my digital data online.41
If the good is understood as internal to those cultural practices in
which we currently engage, then it must be good to consume, to own.
And while social institutions may be viewed, at least to some extent, as
external to individual practices, they certainly help to create the
conditions for particular kinds of practices to occur. Our institutions are
constructed to encourage private ownership and competition, not to share
all in common, as Aristotle requires of friendship.
How can it be doubted? Surely MacIntyre was right when he wrote
38. PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT, HERACLITUS 68 (1968 [c. 500 BC]).
39. See Meno, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 353-384 (Edith Hamilton
and Huntington Cairn, eds., 1961).
40. But see Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
41. See id.
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that we are a long way from Aristotle.
So on what basis shall I (or should I?) find the will or desire to
resist, and become a different sort of character from the one my society
tells me to be? How do I learn to be a friend?
It would surely help if there were a living tradition, a living
community, in which I might practice the "living faculty" of practical
reason that Gene praises in his book.
But where am I to find such a community?
Where do I find such friends?
We cannot even agree on the same set of virtues.
Is it determined by Bentham's felicific calculus of pleasure and
pain? Kantian universal human rights and principles? The Calliclean
and Nietzschean will to power? Duncan Kennedy's and Pierre Schlag's
deconstructive tactics of lucid disillusionment?
Given our ethical disarray, how are we to attain true political
friendship? Friendship requires community. There are no virtues in
solitude.
Two decades ago, Alastair MacIntyre concluded that we need "new
forms of community... within which the moral life could be sustained,
so that both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of
barbarism and darkness. ',42
To my ears, this dire warning rings truer, and more disquietingly,
today than when it was first pronounced.
Gene encourages us to believe that we can still bring life to the
classical ethical tradition. I want to be persuaded by him. I want to
hope.
But hope risks the pain of disappointment.
I think of the line attributed to Aristotle, the one on which Derrida
dwells in his work on political friendship, "0 my friends, there is no
friend. ' 43
A contradictory statement: caught between aspiration and reality.
But there is authenticity even in contradiction.
Perhaps this is the place from which we must begin.
To begin to act like a friend, even when there is no friend to speak
of.
Perhaps to speak as a friend might, to speak about friendship itself,
is enough. To begin.
Out of a common yearning, we invoke together the friendship that is
to come, the friendship that we would create.
Might it be that daring to speak in this way constitutes the very first
42. MACINTYRE, supra note 11, at 263.
43. See DERRIDA, supra note 3, at 1.
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act of political friendship?
In closing, I must convey my gratitude to Gene, for what he has
done. For here we are, not exactly sure what to think, or how to choose
who we should become. And yet, we remain bound together by the
questions that we ask one another.
So I offer my thanks to Gene, for clearing a path to this
conversation, now, at this critical moment, about the meaning and place
of political friendship.
I hope I have done well, in response to the gift of his book.
I hope I have done justice to the spirit of friendship which allows
practical reason to flourish.
